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Marijuana Business Attorneys and the
Professional Deference Standard

INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you practice as an attorney in the State of
Arkansas. A client solicits your advice about opening a marijuana
dispensary or cultivation center. 1 The client might want you to
assist him in filing a dispensary application with the State. On
the other hand, she might want you to negotiate a commercial
lease or to provide services to ensure compliance with municipal
zoning laws. Although Arkansas voters approved a constitutional
amendment permitting medical marijuana sales, 2 you provide a
clear warning to your client: possessing, manufacturing, selling,
and distributing marijuana remains a federal crime. 3 After these
precautions, however, you proceed to business as usual, providing
a routine legal service just as you would for any other client.
This hypothetical prompts an important question. Even
when a legal service is permissible under state law, are lawyers

J.D. Candidate ‘19. The author thanks Carol Rose Goforth, Clayton N. Little Professor
of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, for her thoughtful advice and guidance. The
author also thanks Jordan Blair Woods, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas
School of Law, for leading him to an invaluable resource. Finally, the author thanks his
family for their continued support during the writing process.
1. In March 2018, a Circuit Court judge enjoined Arkansas’ Medical Marijuana
Commission from issuing cultivation permits. See Arkansas Supreme Court to hear medical
marijuana
case,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
7,
2018),
https://apnews.com/3305440416974708b9fda59938cf9332 [https://perma.cc/PZE7-KKU3]
(also available at http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2018/may/07/arkansas-supremecourt-hear-medical-marijuana-case/ [https://perma.cc/PC7N-AQ7V]). The Arkansas
Supreme Court reinstated the licensing process when it reviewed this matter on appeal. See
Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin. v. Naturalis Health, LLC, 2018 Ark. 224, at 10, 549 S.W.3d
901, 908.
2. 2016 General Election and Nonpartisan Runoff Election Results, Official County
Results, Issue No. 6: Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016, ARK. SEC’Y OF
STATE
(Feb.
28,
2017,
1:08
PM),
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/AR/63912/184685/Web01/en/summary.html
[https://perma.cc/FJ2M-7FSU].
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 (b)(1), 812(c)(c)(10), 841(a)(1) (2012).
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criminally liable under federal law for providing services to
marijuana-related clients (“MRCs”)? In many cases, the answer
is probably yes. 4 During the Obama Administration, federal
enforcement of marijuana laws was primarily a matter of
prosecutorial discretion. 5 The Ogden Memo, released by the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in October 2009, instructed
federal prosecutors to refrain from focusing “federal
resources . . . on individuals whose actions are in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws.”6
A
subsequent 2013 memorandum, known as the Cole Memo, stated
that the DOJ would not challenge state marijuana laws so long as
the state laws did not interfere with federal enforcement priorities,
which included:
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors;
Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to
criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels;
Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is
legal under state law in some form to other states;
Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being
used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal
drugs or other illegal activity;
Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation
and distribution of marijuana;
Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other
adverse public health consequences associated with
marijuana use;
Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the
attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by
marijuana production on public lands; and
Preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property. 7
4. Infra Sections I.B., I.C.
5. See generally Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. David W. Ogden on
Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana to
Selected United States Attorneys, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y
GEN.,
at
1-2
(Oct.
19,
2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BY25-63T5].
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. James M. Cole on Guidance Regarding
Marijuana Enforcement to All United States Attorneys, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF
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After these memos were issued, the United States
experienced the birth of a rapidly growing commercial marijuana
industry. Currently, thirty states and the District of Columba have
legalized medical or recreational marijuana. 8 In 2016, consumers
spent approximately $6.7 billion on marijuana, and market
researchers project that sales will reach $20.2 billion by 2021. 9
Like any other business, MRCs require legal assistance for a
variety of issues,10 yet they cannot operate as traditional business
entities. Federal law restricts their access to banking services, 11
contract enforcement remains unpredictable, 12 and MRCs bear
heavier tax burdens because of their status as drug traffickers. 13
Furthermore, it is virtually impossible for MRCs to obtain federal
legal protection from courts regarding potential bankruptcy and
intellectual property issues. 14
DEPUTY
ATT’Y
GEN.,
at
1-2
(Aug.
29,
2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PYV-G4XG].
8. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (June 6, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3Q6S-96DF]
(providing a state-by-state guide of current medical marijuana laws and programs).
9. Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Sales Totaled $6.7 Billion In 2016, FORBES (Jan. 3,
2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/01/03/marijuana-salestotaled-6-7-billion-in-2016/#32a2f2d175e3 [https://perma.cc/6NGE-UJHC].
10. See Ally Marotti, As Marijuana gains acceptance, law firms cultivate new potspecific
practices,
C HI.
TRIB.
(Apr.
19,
2017,
10:02
AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-medical-marijuana-lawyers-0420-biz20170418-story.html [https://perma.cc/7WSA-LSZJ].
11. Daniel J. Beck, Banking and Medical Marijuana in Arkansas – It’s Still Illegal,
THE ARK. BANKER 12, at 8 (Dec. 2016), http://www.qgtlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/Banking-Medical-Marijuana-in-Arkansas-DJB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UJ4H-M2TP].
12. See, e.g., Hammer v. Today’s Health Care II, Nos. CV2011-051310, CV2011051311, 2012 WL 12874349, at *3 (Maricopa Cty. Super. Ct.. Apr. 17, 2012).
13. 26 U.S.C. § 280E (2012); see, e.g., Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v. United States,
894 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2018) (dispensary unsuccessfully sought tax refund after the
IRS denied the dispensary’s request for business tax deductions); see also Peter J. Reilly,
Marijuana Industry Faces Challenging Tax Regime, FORBES (July 19, 2018, 5:39 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2018/07/19/marijuana-industry-faceschallenging-tax-regime/#122a17f52174 [https://perma.cc/VE4Y-X325].
14. See, e.g., In re Arenas, 535 B.R. 845, 847 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2015) (stating that a
debtor in the marijuana business could not obtain relief in federal bankruptcy court); Sam
Kamin & Viva R. Moffat, Trademark Laundering, Useless Patents, and Other IP Challenges
For the Marijuana Industry, 73 WASH. L. REV. 217, 220 (2016) (“Because the bulk of IP law
is federal, the federal marijuana prohibition means that much of IP law is unavailable or
effectively inaccessible to the marijuana industry. Worse yet, marijuana businesses are
denied the regulatory benefits of IP law while remaining subject to its burdens.”).
THE
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Essentially these restrictions recognize that, within the eyes
of the law, the actions of medical and recreational marijuana
businesses are considered criminal conduct. 15 Federal law
designates marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”). 16 This means that all uses of marijuana
(except for government research) 17 are criminalized. 18 Schedule
I classification denotes drugs that presumably have a high
potential for abuse with no accepted medical benefit. 19 Because
marijuana remains a Schedule I drug, many attorneys justifiably
fear that providing legal services and advice to MRCs (although
permissible under state law) might subject them to criminal
liability. In January 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
rescinded the non-enforcement memorandums from the Obama
Administration, evidencing potential governmental intent to
enforce federal marijuana laws.20
Potential criminal liability creates a chilling effect on
attorneys wishing to provide legal services to MRCs. 21
Professional legal ethics rules dictate that attorneys cannot
counsel clients to engage in criminal conduct. 22 Regardless of
these concerns, the legal community now faces an ethical
conundrum facilitated by federalism. State law might invite an
attorney to provide her services to an MRC, yet federal criminal
law lingers in the background. The current legal landscape needs
a standard of liability allowing attorneys to provide their services
when doing so is permitted by state law. At the same time, an
applicable standard must be tempered by the fact that several
states have not legalized medical or recreational marijuana.
15. Erwin Chemerisnky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper, & Sam Kamin, Cooperative
Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 97 (2015).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c)(10) (2012).
17. 21 U.S.C. §§ 872(a), (e) (2012).
18. Helia Garrido Hull, Lost in the Weeds of Pot Law: The Role of Legal Ethics In The
Movement To Legalize Marijuana, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 333, 335 (2014).
19. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
20. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions on Marijuana Enforcement
to All United States Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN.
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download
[https://perma.cc/UDG3-TZD2].
21. See Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and
Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO S T. J. CRIM. L. 183,
202 (2016).
22. See MODEL R ULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended
2016).
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Two cases from the United States Supreme Court’s 2009
term addressed restrictions similar to those faced by marijuana
attorneys.23 Both Milavetz v. United States (“Milavetz”)24 and
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (“Humanitarian Law
Project”)25 spurred questions on whether the First Amendment
protects legal services and attorney advice. 26 Although neither
case directly confronted this question, 27 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the practice of law seems to incorporate
elements of both speech and conduct28—meaning that the legal
profession receives some degree of First Amendment
protection.29
This article proposes that attorneys dealing with MRCs
might rely on the First Amendment as a source of protection. A
coherent attorney advice standard is needed as states continue to
experiment with marijuana legalization. 30 At the core of adopting
a workable standard is the fact that attorney services maintain a
special and elevated status due to their relationship with
governmental power. 31 Legal services enable MRCs to either
invoke the protection of the law, or to avoid the power of the
government.32 For example, the transactional attorney protects
and secures her clients’ property rights.33 Litigators file court
23. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25-27 (2010); Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 232 (2010).
24. 559 U.S. at 232.
25. 561 U.S. at 25-27.
26. See Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 639, 641-48 (2011); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J.
1238, 1262-64 (2016); Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory For Protecting
Attorney Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 30 (2011).
27. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses
of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 1277, 1284 (2005); see also Tarkington, supra note 26, at 30.
28. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2010) (stating that it
would be an extreme position to categorize attorney advice as conduct).
29. The question as to how much protection is provided remains undecided. See
Tarkington, supra note 26, at 36.
30. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 36; see Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to
Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1034 (2016) (“Just as the Court
has narrowly cabined restrictions on crime-advocating speech . . . so courts need to come up
with rules indicating which restrictions on crime-facilitating speech are permissible and
which are forbidden.”).
31. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 37.
32. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 38.
33. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 40-41.
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documents on behalf of their clients to enforce rights and
challenge the application of existing laws.34 Administrative law
attorneys assist their clients in petitioning the government. 35
The standard of liability proposed in this article advocates
for judicial deference to state ethics rules. This article will refer
to the proposed standard as the “professional deference standard.”
First, the professional deference standard would only apply in
jurisdictions where there is a conflict between state and federal
marijuana laws. Second, it would only apply when an attorney’s
services comply with applicable state ethics rules. 36 The author
realizes the professional deference standard is in tension with
federal marijuana laws, which is why Part I of this article
addresses the contours of federal criminal liability and focuses on
the prospect of providing legal services and advice to MRCs. In
spite of this tension, the Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project
cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has wrestled with
circumstances where statutory law prohibits attorneys from
providing legal services. 37 Part II, therefore, briefly explains why
34. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 38.
35. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 62-63. The right to petition one’s government
extends to administrative agencies and courts. See California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all
departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect
of the right of petition.”).
36. Several rule-making bodies in medical and recreational jurisdictions have been
reluctant to modify ethics rules that would permit attorneys to represent MRCs. See, e.g.,
Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 199 (2010) (available at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=110134
[https://perma.cc/9348-VJC8]), rev’d, Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics
Comm’n,
Op.
215
(2017)
(available
at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=734620
[https://perma.cc/ZMZ8-RJSS]); see also Justice J. Brooks, The Ethics of Representing
Marijuana-Related Businesses, 52 THE ARK. L AWYER 2, 22 (Spring 2017) (available at
http://www.qgtlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/The-Ethics-of-RepresentingMarijuana-Related-Business-JJB.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8HK-L4QU]) (noting that while
Arizona’s Ethics Commission interpreted its ethics rules to permit marijuana business
services, Ohio’s Board of Professional Conduct Committee expressly came to a different
conclusion).
37. See cases cited infra Sections II.B, II.C and accompanying text; Legal Servs. Corp.
v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001) (holding that a statute prohibiting government
funded attorneys from challenging the validity of existing welfare laws “exclude[s] from
litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their
nature are within the province of the courts to consider”); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 43639 (1978) (overturning reprimand of an ACLU attorney when she was disciplined for
soliciting clients to pursue litigation as a mechanism of political advocacy); NAACP v.
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attorney advice is deserving of constitutional protection. It also
examines the Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of
deference to professional ethics standards. Although the Court
has expressed its disfavor for statutes that insulate certain issues
from legal challenges,38 this inconsistency is apparent by
comparing Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project. In Milavetz,
the Court held that a bankruptcy provision prohibiting attorneys
from advising clients to acquire additional debt (before filing for
bankruptcy) could not be read in a way to prohibit such advice
when rendered to help clients achieve lawful purposes.39
However, the Humanitarian Law Project decision charted a
different course. The Court upheld a statute that categorically
prohibited attorneys from providing their services to foreign
terrorist organizations, even when the services were provided for
otherwise lawful means such as seeking humanitarian aid and
negotiating peace treaties. 40
The Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project decisions
demonstrate the Supreme Court’s inconsistent application of
deferring to professional ethics standards. 41 Accordingly,
reliance on professional standards is far from a slam-dunk defense
for marijuana business attorneys. But in light of the fact that most
routine legal services seem to violate federal criminal law when
provided to MRCs,42 the First Amendment could and should
provide a conceivable defense. For that reason, Part III explains
why courts should recognize the professional deference standard.
As applied to legal advice and services rendered to MRCs,
adoption of the professional deference standard would allow
attorneys to provide their services without fear of federal
prosecution, and it would protect attorneys within medical and
recreational marijuana jurisdictions. Most importantly, it would
provide clarity to the pressing issue of when an attorney can
represent an MRC.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (“We hold that the activities of the NAACP, its
affiliates and legal staff shown on this record are modes of expression and association
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit, under
its power to regulate the legal profession . . . .”).
38. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546-47.
39. See case cited infra Section II.B and accompanying text (emphasis added).
40. See case cited infra Section II.C and accompanying text.
41. See cases cited infra Sections II.B, II.C and accompanying text.
42. Infra Section I and accompanying text.
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I. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Manufacturing, distributing, or selling marijuana constitutes
a felony under federal law. 43 Violating the CSA can incur a
maximum penalty of five years and a $250,000 fine. 44 Entities
are fined $1 million for violating the CSA. 45 If more than one
thousand kilograms or one thousand marijuana plants are
involved in a CSA violation, the offense can carry a mandatory
minimum penalty of ten years and maximum fines of $10 million
for individuals or $50 million for non-individuals.46 Currently, a
congressional appropriations rider provides limited protection to
those associated with legalized marijuana operations. 47 However,
the rider is a funding mechanism that does not displace
substantive federal law.48 MRCs are still likely to engage in
activities that violate the CSA. Because of this fact, attorneys
remain subject to potential liability as accomplices and coconspirators for providing MRC services. 49
A. THE ROHRABACHER AMENDMENT
The Rohrabacher Amendment is a congressional
appropriations rider that prohibits the DOJ from prosecuting
marijuana activities if an MRC’s actions comply with applicable
state laws.50 This provision only applies to medical marijuana

43. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2012).
45. See id.
46. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2012).
47. TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-53, §§
101(a)(2), 103, 129 Stat. 502, 505-06 (2015) (providing appropriations as specified for
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538,
128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014)).
48. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2016).
49. Accomplice and conspiracy liability are distinct and separate crimes. See, e.g.,
United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 884 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Suppose someone who admired
criminals and hated the police learned that the police were planning a raid on a drug ring,
and, hoping to foil the raid and assure the success of the ring, warned its members—with
whom he had had no previous, or for that matter subsequent, dealings—of the impending
raid. He would be an aider and abettor of the drug conspiracy, but not a member of it.” (citing
United States v. Lane, 514 F.2d 22, 27 (9th Cir. 1975))).
50. TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-53, §§
101(a)(2), 103, 129 Stat. 502, 505-06 (2015) (providing appropriations as specified for
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 538,
128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014)).
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operations—it does not apply to recreational marijuana. 51 In
2016, the Ninth Circuit buttressed protection derived from the
Rohrabacher Amendment. It held that the DOJ could not
prosecute state-approved cultivators and sellers who were in strict
compliance with state law. 52 In order to determine whether the
defendants complied with state law, the Court stated that
establishing a medical marijuana prosecution would require an
evidentiary hearing. 53 Despite this protection, the Court noted
that the Rohrabacher Amendment merely provided temporary
protection against criminal prosecution. 54 Congress could, at any
moment in time, authorize funds to prosecute medical marijuana
crimes.55
The Rohrabacher Amendment does not provide a predictable
safeguard against criminal prosecution. Its continuation is
contingent upon congressional reauthorization, 56 and Attorney
General Jeff Sessions is an outspoken critic of the amendment. 57
Repeal of the amendment would probably allow the DOJ to
pursue federal prosecution. 58 Attorneys should, therefore, be
aware of the potential to incur criminal liability as a result of
providing legal representation to MRCs.
51. Id.
52. McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1178.
53. Id. at 1179.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. At the present moment, the Rohrabacher Amendment is set to expire on September
30, 2018. See Trump signs spending bill that includes medical marijuana protections,
MARIJUANA BUSINESS DAILY (Mar. 23, 2018), https://mjbizdaily.com/trump-signsspending-bill-includes-medical-marijuana-protections/; see also United States v. McIntosh,
833 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2016). (“Congress could appropriate funds for . . . [marijuana]
prosecutions tomorrow.”).
57. Matt Ferner, Senators Defy Jeff Sessions And Vote To Extend Medical Marijuana
Protections,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
27,
2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senators-vote-to-extend-medical-marijuanaprotections-in-defiance-of-jeff-sessions_us_597a4177e4b02a4ebb7420a1
[https://perma.cc/WV49-GGAS] (quoting Jeff Sessions: “I believe it would be unwise for
Congress to restrict the discretion of the Department to fund particular prosecutions,
particularly in the midst of an historic drug epidemic and potentially long-term uptick in
violent crime.”).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d
1039, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“[A]s long as Congress precludes the Department of Justice
from expending funds in the manner proscribed by Section 538 [of the Continuing
Appropriations Act], the permanent injunction will only be enforced against MAMM insofar
as that organization is in violation of California [s]tate laws . . . .”) (internal quotations
omitted).
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B. AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
Federal aiding and abetting law imposes liability on those
who assist in the commission of others’ crimes. It contains two
components: a defendant must (1) take an affirmative act in
furtherance of the principal’s underlying offense, and (2) she must
act with the intent to facilitate the commission of the principal’s
crime.59 Although aiders and abettors do not commit the actual
underlying criminal offense, the aiding and abetting statute
punishes defendants as if they were principals, i.e., the
perpetrators of the actual crime. 60 The statute states that
“[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission,
is punishable as a principal.” 61 Because this provision eliminates
the distinction between the principals and the accomplice, 62
attorneys who counsel their clients in violation of the CSA could
be punished in the same manner as their clients.63
The statute does not require aiders or abettors to participate
in every aspect of a principal’s crime. 64 Participation in any part
of a CSA violation may be sufficient to establish aiding and
abetting liability.65 In helping the principal commit a criminal
offense, aiders and abettors must possess a sufficiently culpable
mental state.66 They need to have advanced knowledge of the fact
that a principal will commit a criminal offense.67 Such
knowledge would provide the defendant with sufficient notice to
refrain from participating in an activity that assists the principal. 68
In light of the intent requirement, courts have struggled to
determine whether convicting an aider and abettor requires a
standard of actual knowledge or purpose. 69 An actual knowledge
59. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 (2014).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).
61. Id.
62. See Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking? The Mental State of the Aider and
Abettor and the Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1355 (2002).
63. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(vii), 841(b)(1)(D) (2012).
64. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1247.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1248.
67. Id. at 1249.
68. Id.
69. See Weiss, supra note 63 at 1378; see also G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy,
Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory,
Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability Under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1410-
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standard (i.e., knowing assistance or encouragement) means that
prosecutors must merely look to see if the defendant possessed
knowledge that her activity would facilitate an illegal action. 70
Under this standard, a blameworthy state of mind is often implicit
in the fact that the defendant associated with the principal in a
criminal activity. 71 On the other hand, the traditional formulation
for the purpose-based standard requires: (1) that a defendant
associated herself with an illegal venture, (2) that she participated
in the venture as something she wished to bring about, and (3)
that she desired to make the venture succeed. 72
There is very little authority addressing when a lawyer’s
involvement in an illegal action constitutes liability under aiding
and abetting law.73 As with any regular business, MRCs need
attorneys for a range of services. Examples include negotiating
contracts and leasehold agreements, as well as compliance with
municipal zoning laws and administrative regulations.74
Culpability that merely requires knowledge would be easy to
establish in each of these situations because an attorney will likely
know that her services enable clients to commit a CSA
violation.75 For example, negotiating a lease for a marijuana
business most likely reflects the attorney’s knowledge that his
client desires to either grow, possess, sell, or distribute

11 (1996) (“The course of judicial decisions on the meaning of ‘willfully’ does not run
straight.”); Rory Little, Opinion Analysis: Justice Kagan Writes a Primer on Aiding and
Abetting
Law,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar.
6,
2014,
9:04
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/03/opinion-analysis-justice-kagan-writes-a-primer-onaiding-and-abetting-law/ [https://perma.cc/HVF6-YQT2] (“[W]hether a defendant must
have ‘knowledge’ or ‘purpose’ to facilitate the crime is not clearly answered . . . .”).
70. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 69, at 1411-13.
71. See Kit Kinports, Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements of Complicity, 52 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 133, 136 (2015).
72. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
73. Jens David Olin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 193, 212 n.118 (2002).
74. See generally Mark J. Fucile, The Intersection of Professional Duties and Federal
Law as States Decriminalize Marijuana, 23 THE PROF. LAW. 1, 3 (2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/professional_lawyer/volume_2
3_number_1/ABA_PLN_v023n01_003_the_intersection_of_professional_duties_and_fede
ral_law_as_states_decriminalize_marijuana.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KF2LFWHK]. A mistaken belief that a client’s conduct is lawful will not help a defendant escape
aiding and abetting liability. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL L AW 167
(5th ed. 2009).
75. See Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR.
L. REV. 869, 903 (2013).
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marijuana.76 To put it simply, the attorney probably knows that
her client is utilizing the space for those very purposes, 77 and it is
irrelevant as to whether she intends for her client to violate the
CSA.
In comparison to a mere knowledge standard, a standard
requiring purpose examines if the aider and abettor engaged in
conduct aimed at facilitating a CSA violation. Providing even a
routine legal service seems to cross this threshold. 78 Because
federal law does not recognize any form of commercial marijuana
use, providing a transactional legal service likely reveals a
lawyer’s specific intent to help a client violate federal marijuana
law. In other words, the lawyer herself would desire for her client
to succeed in their plan to grow, possess, sell, or distribute
marijuana.79
Regardless of the standard of intent applied for a criminal
conviction, lawyers wishing to avoid liability should refrain from
encouraging clients to violate the CSA. 80 They should also
refrain from encouraging clients to engage in actions aimed at
circumventing criminal prosecution. 81 In order to avoid the
appearance of intending to violate the CSA, a marijuana business
attorney would need to limit her advice to informing clients about
the legal consequences of their proposed courses of action. 82
Nevertheless, most of the legal services provided to an MRC stray
far from this type of theoretical advice and would likely constitute
proof of aiding and abetting liability. 83
C. CONSPIRACY LIABILITY
Conspiratorial liability is more far-reaching than aiding and
abetting liability. The federal conspiracy statute states that:
76. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
77. See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012).
78. See Olin, supra note 73, at 212 n.118 (noting that most accomplice liability cases
involving lawyers are those with attorneys engaged in transactional work).
79. See, e.g., Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that a
medical marijuana prescription written by a physician would reveal the physician’s “specific
intent to provide a patient with the means to acquire marijuana.”).
80. A. Claire Frezza, Counseling Clients on Medical Marijuana: Ethics Caught in
Smoke, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL E THICS 537, 552-53 (2012).
81. Id.
82. See Bruce E. Reinhart, Up in Smoke or Down in Flames? A Florida Lawyer’s
Legal and Ethical Risks in Advising a Marijuana Industry Client, 90 FLA. B.J. 21, 26 (2016).
83. See Kamin & Wald, supra note 75, at 907.
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[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 84

In comparison to an aiding and abetting conviction, the
finding of a conspiracy does not require that a principal party
complete an underlying offense. 85
Under the Pinkerton
conspiracy liability doctrine, an attorney working with MRCs
could be liable as a co-conspirator, as well as for the federal
violation itself pursuant to the CSA. 86 All that conspiracy liability
requires is an agreement between the attorney and a client to
commit a criminal offense. 87
An attorney likely enters a criminal conspiracy as soon as
she agrees to perform a service in furtherance of an MRC’s
legitimate business needs.88 Successive actions taken on behalf
of the client will probably further the object of the client’s
conspiracy, i.e., to commit an action in violation of the CSA. 89
As for the defendant’s state of mind, most jurisdictions require
that a co-conspirator act with the purpose to bring about a criminal
offense.90 As with aiding and abetting liability, performing even
a routine legal service becomes problematic as an attorney helps
a client acquire a stake in the success of a marijuana business. 91
For example, if a lawyer forms an attorney-client relationship
with an MRC for the purpose of providing a transactional service,
this would probably demonstrate strong evidence of culpable
intent.92 Similarly, advice regarding administrative compliance

84. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
85. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (“The agreement to do
an unlawful act is . . . distinct from the doing of the act.”).
86. United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1214 (9th Cir. 2014).
87. United States v. Fenton, 367 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2004).
88. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
327, 358 (1998)
89. Id.
90. See Kamin & Wald, supra note 75, at 913 (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943)).
91. See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713 (1943) (“Petitioner’s
stake here was in making the profits which it knew could come only from its encouragement
of Tate’s illicit operations.”).
92. Id.
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on the state level would not escape the fact that the CSA trumps
the existence of state marijuana regulatory regimes. 93
Accordingly, such services are likely to implicate conspiratorial
liability and thus, provide a basis for criminal prosecution.
D. TENSION BETWEEN FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND A LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL DUTIES
An attorney should tread with extreme caution when
providing counsel to clients involved in the medical and
recreational marijuana industries. Even though the Rohrabacher
Amendment provides an important limitation to the DOJ’s ability
to prosecute medical marijuana cases, the risk of federal liability
persists. Many of the services provided during the attorney-client
relationship are ongoing, which provides an extended basis for
prosecutors to establish criminal liability. 94 However, it is clear
that the prospect of federal prosecution chills attorneys from
rendering services to MRCs. 95 This consideration is particularly
troublesome when considering that lack of federal enforcement
during the Obama Administration encouraged the growth of the
commercial marijuana industry.
Attorneys now face an ethical conundrum facilitated by
federalism. It is well established within the legal community that
“[a] lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not constitute an
endorsement of the client’s . . . activities.”96 Even if an attorney
93. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (holding that Congress possesses the
authority to regulate marijuana through the Commerce Clause); see also Waldon v.
Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 941 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (stating that compliance
with state law was not a proper defense for violating Title VII).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 334 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003). In
Hamilton, the Second Circuit upheld a police officer’s aiding and abetting conviction for
providing protection to a crack house operation. Id. at 173. The Court held it was irrelevant
that an illegal drug transaction did not occur before the officer spoke to a government
informant. Id. at 180. Providing protection to the crack house constituted an ongoing
activity. Id.
95. See, e.g., Ohio Bd. Prof’l Conduct., Adv. Op. No. 2016-6 (Aug. 5, 2016); Me. Bd.
of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 199 (2010) (available at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=110134
[https://perma.cc/9348-VJC8]), rev’d, Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics
Comm’n,
Op.
215
(2017)
(available
at
http://www.
Mebraoverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=734620 [https://perma.cc/ZMZ8RJSS]).
96. MODEL R ULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended
2016).
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learns of her client’s present or future criminal plans, the attorney
is not obligated to disclose them. 97 Instead, the attorney is
obligated to refrain from facilitating clients’ present and future
criminal enterprises, 98 and she must withdraw from
representations in violation of the law.99
The ethical implications of representing an MRC remain
ambiguous. It is conceivable for an attorney to be prosecuted for
representing a client when the client’s actions are in full
compliance with state law. 100 The attorney herself could fully
comply with the applicable state ethics code, 101 and the focus of
the attorney’s efforts might center on determining the validity and
application of existing marijuana laws.102 The prospect of
criminal prosecution, however, is a powerful disincentive against
representing MRCs. Potential criminal liability creates a legal
environment where attorneys are apprehensive to provide their
services to an industry legitimized by state law and popular
opinion. Chilled representation inhibits a client’s ability to
operate within the eyes of the law. In a regulatory environment
with sparse legal representation, MRCs would have little
guidance in navigating existing laws. Regulatory compliance in
the commercial marijuana industry will require representation by
an attorney.103 Despite the public’s growing acceptance of
marijuana, government authorities will continue to maintain an
interest in regulating when, where, and how marijuana can be
manufactured and sold. Chilled representation, therefore, is not
desirable, especially as states continue to experiment with
legalizing and regulating medical and recreational marijuana. 104

97. See id. at 1.6(a), (b).
98. See id. at 1.2(d).
99. Id. at 1.16(a)(1).
100. Hull, supra note 18, at 351.
101. See, e.g., COLO. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (2018); CONN. R. PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2018); WASH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 18 (2014).
102. See MODEL R ULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983,
amended 2016).
103. See Tarkington, supra note 26, at 61 (advocating an access-to-justice theory
where First Amendment protection would be provided when attorney speech is “essential to
the proper functioning of . . . [the] justice system”).
104. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its

804

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:3

II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE PROFESSIONAL
DEFERENCE STANDARD
Perhaps the only effective defense for counseling MRCs is
to rely on the professional deference standard. This standard
advocates judicial deference to professional state ethics rules. 105
The Supreme Court’s application of such deference is
inconsistent,106 but prior case-law indicates that courts might be
willing to hold that marijuana attorneys are obligated to advise
clients in a competent manner, even when federal law conflicts
with professional standards.107 This section will briefly analyze
why attorney speech merits First Amendment protection. Then,
it will examine how the professional deference standard might
operate by analyzing Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project.
These cases did not address situations where federal and state law
conflicted with one another, but similar to federal aiding or
abetting and conspiracy laws, the relevant statutes operated in a
way that restricted attorneys from rendering legal services to their
clients.
A. ATTORNEY ADVICE AS PROTECTED SPEECH
In response to state laws that have legalized medical or
recreational marijuana, several state bar associations and ethics
boards have liberalized Rule 1.2(d) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. 108 Liberalization ensures that an attorney
does not violate her professional duties when representing MRCs
so long as the attorney complies with applicable state law.109 The
prospect of representing an MRC might pose a situation where
lawyers are torn between their professional duties and their duty
citizens chose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”).
105. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (“The weight of
prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding
the risk of deportation.”); but see Haupt, supra note 26, at 1281-82 (noting that courts have
retreated from providing deference to professional norms in attorney advertising cases).
106. See cases cited supra Sections II.B, II.C and accompanying text.
107. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 245-47
(2010); see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 2002).
108. MODEL R ULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended
2016); see, e.g., COLO. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (2018); CONN. R. PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2018); WASH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 18 (2014).
109. See Brooks, supra note 36, at 23.
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to avoid criminal wrongdoing. 110 So long as there is variation
between the federal marijuana laws and professional codes of
conduct, it appears possible that state ethics rules will not
encompass current criminal law on the basis that the criminal law
is too restrictive. 111 However, when viewed alongside the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the criminal law might function
as an external source of regulating the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is possible for the criminal law to sanction
conduct that would otherwise be permissible within the
profession, i.e., permitted by accepted professional rules and
standards.112
When courts address situations where the criminal law
regulates conduct in the legal profession, the Restatement on the
Law of Governing Lawyers states that courts should consider
“[t]he traditional and appropriate activities of a lawyer in
representing a client in accordance with the requirements of the
applicable lawyer code . . . .”113 Although professional codes do
not supersede statutory law, the Restatement acknowledges the
desirability to construe a criminal statute so as “to make it
consistent with . . . [the] applicable lawyer-code provision.”114
The Restatement acknowledges that courts have “limited
authority to interpret criminal provisions to accommodate
professional norms.”115 It seems to presuppose that professional
standards might provide a basis for how courts determine the
scope of lawyer misconduct when evaluating violations of
substantive law.
The Supreme Court has expressed its willingness to provide
some deference to professional legal standards when analyzing
constitutional issues.116 In cases where a statute restricts a client’s
110. RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF THE L AW GOVERNING L AWYERS § 8 (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (“[A] lawyer is guilty of an offense for an act committed in the course of representing
a client to the same extent and on the same basis as would a nonlawyer acting similarly.”).
111. See Green, supra note 88, at 391.
112. See Green, supra note 88, at 329.
113. RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF L AW GOVERNING L AWYERS § 8 (AM. L AW INST.
2000).
114. Id. at § 8 cmt. c.
115. Green, supra note 88, at 382.
116. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010) (“We long have
recognized that ‘[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association
standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable . . . .’ Although they
are ‘only guides,’ and not ‘inexorable commands,’ these standards may be valuable measures
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ability to challenge existing laws through prohibiting attorney
advice or legal services, Supreme Court precedent seems to
generally choose outcomes avoiding suppression of the advice or
service.117 The current conflict between federal and state
marijuana laws presents an opportunity for the Court to clarify
how it can utilize professional standards in interpreting statutory
bans on attorney advice and legal services. More fundamentally,
the conflict might present an opportunity to recognize advice
rendered during the attorney-client relationship as a distinct form
of speech protected by the First Amendment. 118
Despite the fact that the Court has not directly addressed
whether attorney advice merits First Amendment protection,
Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project scratched the surface of
this issue.119 Both cases illustrated the possible impact that
professional standards might have in determining the appropriate
level of protection for legal advice. Milavetz demonstrated the
Court’s willingness to defer to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.120 On the other hand, Humanitarian Law Project
produced a holding that contradicted the Model Rules. 121
Therefore, as demonstrated below, the level of deference placed
on the Model Rules could play a critical role in determining the
permissibility of an attorney advice prohibition. 122
B. MILAVETZ, GALLOP & MILAVETZ, P.A. V. UNITED
STATES
The Milavetz case involved regulations promulgated under a
provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”). 123 Under these regulations,

of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation . . . .”) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Bobby v. Van Hook
558 U.S. 4, 7-8 (2009)).
117. See Knake, supra note 26, at 672; see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531
U.S. 533, 549 (2001); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428-29 (1963).
118. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 98 (advocating a First Amendment standard that
protects advice rendered to an attorney’s clients).
119. Tarkington, supra note 26, at 33.
120. See case cited supra Section II.B and accompanying text (emphasis added).
121. See case cited supra Section II.C and accompanying text.
122. See Knake, supra note 26, at 656.
123. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231-32 (2010).
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a “debt relief agency”—a term that encompassed attorneys 124—is
precluded from advising clients to acquire additional debt before
filing for bankruptcy. 125 A law firm contended the prohibition
comprised an unconstitutional restriction under the First
Amendment.126 It argued that BAPCPA operated in a manner that
would have prevented otherwise lawful and beneficial advice. 127
The Eighth Circuit agreed, noting that the ban prohibited
attorneys from “advising any . . . person to incur any additional
debt in contemplation of bankruptcy.” 128 The court said the
prohibition was not sufficiently tailored under the First
Amendment because the prohibition banned beneficial
bankruptcy advice not aimed at circumventing, abusing, or
undermining bankruptcy laws.129 For example, beneficial advice
could have included advising debtors to refinance a home
mortgage to lower mortgage payments, or to incur additional debt
so that a debtor may purchase a reliable vehicle. 130 Such practices
would not have harmed creditors in a menacing manner, and
therefore, it was both lawful and advisable for debtors to acquire
additional debt in these situations. 131
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed the
Eighth Circuit’s decision on grounds of statutory interpretation,
not on a constitutional basis. 132 The Court’s analysis concluded
that BAPCPA adequately protected attorney-client discussions
when clients possessed valid reasons for incurring additional
debt.133 The prohibition against advising clients to incur
additional debt only applied to advice that recommended debtors
124. A “debt relief agency” included “any person who provides any bankruptcy
assistance to an assisted person in return for the payment of money or other valuable
consideration . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2012).
125. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 233.
126. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir.
2008).
127. See Brief for Petitioners at 24, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States,
559 U.S. 229 (2010).
128. Milavetz, 541 F.3d at 793 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 794.
130. Id. at 793-94.
131. Id.
132. See Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 248
(2010). Because the Court evaluated the restriction as a matter of statutory interpretation, it
did not consider the provision’s First Amendment implications. Id.
133. Id. at 243 (concluding the statute prohibited acquiring more debt because of one’s
status as a debtor, as opposed to a valid purpose).
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acquire more debt because they were about to file for
bankruptcy.134
Even if statutory interpretation did not resolve the issue of
whether BAPCPA prohibited beneficial legal advice, the Court
suggested in dicta that it would have reached the same conclusion
based on what comprises an attorney’s professional
obligations.135
The Court indicated that interpreting the
prohibition as inconsistent with Model Rule 1.2(d) “serves no
conceivable purpose within [BAPCPA’s] statutory scheme.” 136
The Model Rule states that attorneys cannot counsel and assist
their clients to engage in criminal or fraudulent activity. 137 In a
footnote, the Court said that reading the prohibition to forbid
lawful advice would have seriously undermined the attorneyclient relationship and the discussion inherent in such a
relationship.138
In sum, the Supreme Court looked to professional standards
in examining a prohibition on attorney speech. 139 Specifically,
the Court indicated its willingness to defer to the Model Rules as
guidance for determining the scope of an attorney’s professional
duties when those duties were framed by BAPCPA’s statutory
scheme.140 But shortly after the Milavetz decision, the Supreme
Court reversed course and declined to defer to professional
standards when presented with another situation that involved a
prohibition on attorney advice. 141
C. HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,142 the Court
examined a statute that imposed criminal punishment on anyone
who provided “‘material support . . .’ to certain foreign

134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 246.
136. Id.; see also Knake, supra note 26, at 651-52; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended 2016).
137. MODEL R ULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended
2016).
138. Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246 n.5
(2010).
139. Haupt, supra note 26, at 1263.
140. Id.
141. Supra Section II.C and accompanying text.
142. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 1 (2010).
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organizations that engage in terrorist activity.” 143 The issue in
this case was whether legal services provided by Humanitarian
Law Project (“HLP”) amounted to such “material support.” 144
HLP was a human rights organization that sought to help the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (“PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil (“LTTE”) utilize international law to negotiate peace
agreements.145 The material support statute applied to the PKK
and LTTE because both groups were designated as foreign
terrorist organizations (“FTOs”) by the United States Department
of State.146
In contrast to its approach in Milavetz, the Court analyzed
the material support prohibition as a First Amendment issue. 147
The statute did not prohibit generalized, non-specialized advice
to FTOs.148 Instead, it barred providing specialized knowledge,
such as how to petition the United Nations, or how to utilize
international law.149 Although the Court applied a First
Amendment standard that was “more demanding” than “the kind
of intermediate . . . standard” that applies to non-speech
restrictions,150 it concluded the material support prohibition did
not violate HLP’s freedom of speech. 151
Unsuccessfully, HLP attempted to distinguish advice that
was meaningful and legitimate under federal law, as opposed to
advice that undermined the government’s interest in countering
terrorism.152 This argument is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Milavetz, which demonstrated that the Court
was unwilling to interpret BAPCPA in a way that prohibited
otherwise lawful legal advice, i.e., advice that would not have

143. Id. at 7 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012)).
144. Id. at 11.
145. Id. at 14-15.
146. Id. at 9.
147. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 27-28.
148. Id. As applied to HLP, the Court concluded that the material support provisions
barred “training” PKK and LTTE members on how to use humanitarian and international
law, as well as providing “expert advice or assistance” to these groups. Id. at 21-22.
149. Id. at 27.
150. Id. at 45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). In O’Brien, the Court
established a First Amendment test addressing situations where the government attempts to
regulate something other than speech, but the effect of the restriction incidentally affects
speech. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
151. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010).
152. Id. at 29.
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abused the protections of the bankruptcy system. 153 The material
support statute prohibited unthreatening, beneficial advice with
respect to its ban on providing services intended to help FTOs.154
Despite similarities as to how these provisions affected attorney
advice, the Court agreed with the government. 155 It concluded
that services aimed at promoting peaceful activities might further
terrorism through legitimizing FTOs within the public sphere. 156
Justice Breyer’s dissent appreciated the consequence of the
Court’s failure to recognize a line between lawful advice and
advice that aided a client’s criminal activity. 157 He noted that the
Court’s ruling produced a “chill[ing]” effect on counseling these
organizations—that it permitted criminalizing speech that would
have otherwise received First Amendment protection. 158
Regardless of this reasoning, the Court’s majority held that the
material support statute did not violate HLP’s freedom of
speech.159 Rather than distinguishing between advice that an
attorney could and could not render, Humanitarian Law Project
upheld a ban that conclusively prohibited and criminalized the
formation of the attorney-client relationship between an attorney
and a designated FTO.160 Deference to Model Rule 1.2(d) would
have meant legal advice pertaining to the lawful use of
international law and humanitarian aid should have been
protected.161 In the majority opinion, however, Justice Roberts
emphasized the narrow application of the Court’s holding.162 He
153. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246
(2010).
154. See Knake, supra note 26, at 713.
155. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 30-39.
156. Id. at 30. The Court noted several examples. The existence of HLP’s legal
services might strain the United States’ relations with its allies and consequently undermine
international efforts to combat terrorism. Id. at 32. Likewise, HLP’s capability to provide
advice to FTOs might allow these groups to take advantage of legitimate legal services for
illicit objectives, e.g., the PKK could utilize peace negotiations as a means to buy time for
short-term military setbacks; the LTTE might redirect tsunami-related aid to violent
activities. Id. at 37.
157. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40-41 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
158. Id. at 27, 50, 55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 38.
160. See 18 U.S.C. §2339B (2012); see also Tarkington, supra note 26, at 79.
161. Knake, supra note 26, at 656. Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits counseling clients in
a way that furthers criminal or fraudulent conduct. See MODEL R ULES OF P ROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983, amended 2016).
162. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39.
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stated that future applications of the material support statute
might not survive First Amendment scrutiny. 163 He also
suggested that a similar prohibition might not extend to advice
offered to domestic organizations. 164
III. THE PROFESSIONAL DEFERENCE STANDARD
AND MARIJUANA BUSINESS ATTORNEYS
As lawyers, speech is our stock in trade . . . . Our tools are
books and not saws or scalpels. Our product is argument,
persuasion, negotiation, and documentation, so speaking (by
which I include writing) is not only central to what the legal
system is all about, and not only the product of law as we know
it, but basically the only thing that lawyers and the legal system
have.165
Questions surrounding the constitutional parameters of
attorney advice linger following the Milavetz and Humanitarian
Law Project decisions.166
Humanitarian Law Project
acknowledged that the legal profession receives some degree of
First Amendment protection. 167 Unfortunately, neither Milavetz
nor Humanitarian Law Project provided helpful guidance on how
to address statutory provisions that limit the availability of legal
advice.168 The Milavetz decision was consistent with and
deferential to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 169
Humanitarian Law Project provided a holding inconsistent with
the Model Rules.170
The notion that deference can be provided to professional
ethical standards should be implicit in recognizing attorney
advice as a category of protected speech. 171 A constitutional
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and The Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L. REV.
687, 688 (1997).
166. Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 639, 656 (2011).
167. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
168. Knake, supra note 26, at 656.
169. Supra Section II.B.
170. Supra Section II.C.
171. See Knake, supra note 26, at 683-84 (2011) (“[A]n appreciation of the ABA
standards is important not only because they reveal how legislative advice bans compromise
the duties and obligations demanded by the attorney-client relationship, but because those
standards can offer a meaningful measure of constitutional rights.”); Haupt, supra note 26,
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protection for attorney speech might be necessary to ensure that
marijuana businesses can make a good faith effort in attempting
to invoke or avoid the authority of the law. 172 Judicial deference
to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct would provide a basis
for attorneys to represent these clients.
Within states that have legalized medical or recreational
marijuana, several professional ethics bodies have responded to
legalization by limiting Model Rule 1.2(d)’s application to
violations of state law.173 For example, Arizona’s Ethics
Commission has stated:
[W]e decline to interpret and apply ER 1.2(d) in a manner
that would prevent a lawyer who concludes that the client’s
proposed conduct is in “clear and unambiguous compliance” with
state law from assisting the client in connection with activities
expressly authorized under state law, thereby depriving clients of
the very legal advice and assistance that is needed to engage in
the conduct that the state law expressly permits.174
In states similar to Arizona, attorneys who are in compliance
with state law are professionally protected from representing
marijuana businesses. Federal marijuana law, however, prohibits
them from providing services that would otherwise be legal.175
Due to this fact, several state ethics boards within medical
marijuana jurisdictions have been reluctant to liberalize Rule
1.2(d) because of the prospect that an attorney could incur
criminal liability under federal law. 176
at 1241-42 (contending for a First Amendment standard protecting professional speech based
on deference to professional institutions, i.e., knowledge communities); William T.
Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California
State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485, 489 (1995) (pointing out that lawyers “alone have the
specialized knowledge to understand the unique nature of their profession’s problems and
hence, to apply effective cures”).
172. See Tarkington, supra note 26, at 84 (stating that an access-to-justice theory
justifies First Amendment protection for attorney speech).
173. See, e.g., COLO. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (2018); CONN. R. PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2018); WASH. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 18 (2014) (emphasis
added).
174. State Bar of Ariz. R. of Prof’l Conduct Comm’n, Formal Op. 11-01 (2011)
(available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=710
[https://perma.cc/5Y6Q-LH56]) (internal quotations omitted).
175. Supra Sections I.B and I.C and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Prof’l Conduct Comm., Informal Op. 2016-6
(2016); Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 199 (2010) (available
at
http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=110134
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Criminalizing an attorney’s ability to represent an MRC
ignores the reality that states have elected to undertake a bold
experiment in federalism—and that the federal government has
been permissive in allowing these states to proceed. Because of
the fact that states are unlikely to reverse course on medical and
recreational marijuana, significant policy concerns justify a
solution to the issue of MRC representation. A constitutional
protection for attorneys representing MRCs would provide clarity
to the issue of marijuana representation.177 A standard reliant on
judicial deference to professional norms is ideal.
Members of a profession maintain interests in speaking in a
manner consistent with the values and standards of the
profession.178 Conceivably, a professional deference standard
that protects marijuana business attorneys would contain two key
features. First, it would entail deference to state rules of
professional conduct as a way to protect attorneys within medical
or recreational marijuana jurisdictions from federal prosecution.
Second, it would only apply when attorneys are in compliance
with applicable state laws and ethics rules.
Most likely, a constitutional standard reliant on professional
deference would encourage state bar associations and ethics
boards to proceed with rulemaking in a manner consistent with
state law.179 The standard would also balance an attorney’s role
as a representative of his client’s interests, as well as his role as
an officer of the legal system. 180 A professional deference
standard, moreover, would recognize the need to resolve
questions on when a statute can impose a prohibition on attorney

[https://perma.cc/9348-VJC8]), rev’d, Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics
Comm’n,
Op.
215
(2017)
(available
at
http://www.
Mebraoverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=734620 [https://perma.cc/ZMZ8RJSS]).
177. See Knake, supra note 26, at 645 (noting that there is not a clear standard
protecting attorney advice).
178. Haupt, supra note 26, at 1272-73 (“The professional speaker has a unique
autonomy interest in communicating her message according to the standards of the
profession to which she belongs, precisely in order to uphold the integrity of its knowledge
community. Physicians, for instance, should not be compelled to speak in a way that
undermines their profession’s scientific insights.”).
179. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 36.
180. Kamin & Wald, supra note 75, at 931.
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advice and legal services. 181 Federal criminal law prohibits
marijuana business attorneys from engaging in services that might
be consistent with applicable professional norms and rules of
conduct.182 Currently, attorneys are prohibited from rendering
otherwise lawful advice, i.e., they cannot lawfully provide routine
legal services when state law permits them to do so. There exists
a strong interest in minimizing the discrepancy between a
lawyer’s legal obligations and her professional duties. Adoption
of the professional deference standard would ensure that a
marijuana business attorney could operate within the eyes of the
law.
CONCLUSION
The professional deference standard might function as a
potential defense for circumventing federal liability. Judicial
deference to state rules of conduct might limit liability with regard
to providing routine legal services. Furthermore, adoption of the
professional deference standard might help courts delineate
distinctions between permissible and impermissible services
rendered on behalf of MRCs.183
At this point in time, the author cautions readers from relying
on the First Amendment as a mechanism for protecting attorney
advice. It is practically certain that most routine legal services
provided to MRCs cross the line into aiding or abetting and
conspiracy liability. Deference to professional standards is by no
means a definitive principle to rely on. While Milavetz illustrated
that the Supreme Court was willing to provide deference to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Humanitarian Law Project
ruled contrary to the Model Rules when the Court reviewed
another attorney advice prohibition. The Court’s inconsistency,
therefore, demonstrates that the First Amendment and
professional deference is an imperfect defense to federal liability.
Notwithstanding this consideration, such an argument is quite

181. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246-47
(2010); but see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34, 36, 39 (2010).
182. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“All the activities [at issue] involve the communication and advocacy of political ideas and
lawful means of achieving political ends.”). See also Green, supra note 88, at 391.
183. See Volokh, supra note 30, at 1034.
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possibly the only realistic defense for attorneys wishing to
represent marijuana business entities.
ANDREW DIXON

